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THE STATE'S RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION.
I.
"DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NATIONS."
What was done by the American Institute of International Law
at its first session, held in Washington, January, 1916, is worthy of
careful consideration and study. It laid down the basis for a recon-
struction of international law in a "Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Nations." The substance of that Declaration is as follows:
I. Every nation has the right to exist, and to protect and conserve
its existence; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the
act of the State to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the
commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending States.
2. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that
it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself
without interference or control from other States, provided that in
so doing it does not interfere with or violate the rights of other States.
3. Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every
other nation belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have
the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of
the United States, "to assume, among the powers of the earth, the
separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's
God entitles them."
4. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boun-
daries, and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over its territory, and all
persons whether native or foreign found therein.
5. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled
to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for
right and duty are corelative, and the right of one it is the duty of all
to observe.
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6. International law is at one and the same time both national and
international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land and
applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its princi-
ples; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of
nations and applicable, as such, to all questions between and among
the members of the society of nations involving its principles.
This Declaration, both on account of the name it bears and the
principles it proclaims, has been misunderstood. Some people have
thought that it was a reversion to the declarations of rights in vogue
when America was winning her independence and when France was in
the throes of revolution, and that, although there might have been a
reason for such declarations in those days, no such reason exists now.
The Declaration of the Institute simply repeats what has already been
said in these earlier declarations and in the works of publicists on this
subject, as well as what is recognized in the practice of states. Others
say that to lay down the basis, even if it is a new one, for this recon-
structidn is useless as long as the edifice itself remains unbuilt. Still
others contend that to declare the rights of nations while there are no
courts to apply them, nor adequate sanctions to protect them from
violation, produces very imperfect results, and it was for this very
reason that the practice of declaring rights fell into disuse.
If we set aside this last observation, which is a correct one and
which I on another occasion have already discussed in speaking of the
means whereby the rules of international law may be made effectual,
the remaining objections have no ground to stand on. My present
purpose is to show the sound wisdom that lies beneath the surface of
the Declaration and the hopes that it inspires for the future of inter-
national law.
In another place I have sketched the development and charac-
teristics of the rights of independence and of liberty in the states of
our continent, and the different conception of these same rights in
Europe. Where these rights are concerned, therefore, we cannot
speak-of a universal international law.
We shall now consider the other rights proclaimed in the Declara-
tion of the Institute-the rights of existence, of free development, of
sovereignty, and of legal equality, and the limitations of which they
are susceptible.
We shall first examine these rights together, because it is scarcely
possible to draw a line of demarcation between them. All refer to
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preservation of the state, and the divisions or classifications that some
writers make are simply different manifestations of the right of self-
preservation. Then these rights give rise to other rights, which play a
very important part in international relations, and it is also very diffi-
cult to say with which one of the fundamental rights they are con-
nected.
The fundamental rights of which we shall now speak are very
old. They arose with international law itself. Grotius proclaimed
them in his immortal work De jure belli et pacis, published in 1625,
and the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 formally recognized legal
equality. These rights are not, however, so distinctively American in
character as those of independence and of liberty. They belong to
universal law, but this fact does not prevent their having certain well-
defined features peculiar to our continent.
All these fundamental rights were easy to determine under the
individualistic regime, when there were very few bonds between
states. But today, as the result of the progress of civilization, better
means of communication and the development of commerce, creating
economic and social rivalry as well as interdependence, these rights are
disregarded, or else the exercise of some one of them is always a limi-
tation of some other fundamental right. It is therefore impossible
to say when a state keeps within the just limits of its rights and when
it abuses or disregards the rights of others. The same is true of soli-
darity and the general interest, which are further recognized limitations
of the said fundamental rights and which the Declaration of the Insti-
tute formally sanctions. International law lays down no rules on the
subject; that is to say, it does not determine what privileges flow from
the fundamental rights and what are their limitations. This is perhaps
its gravest defect. One thing that is well worth noting is that with the
development of social life some of these rights acquire more or less
superiority over others, and the latter must therefore yield to the
former. For instance, the right of exclusive jurisdiction could in days
gone by act as a check on the right to protect nationals in foreign
countries, which springs from the right of self-preservation. Today
the opposite is true. This same right of exclusive jurisdiction for-
merly allowed a state to refuse to recognize that a foreign law applied
in its territory; today it is just the reverse.
We shall now consider what is the present status of these various
fundamental rights, according to European and American practice,
and then discuss how they should be regulated in the future.
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II.
RIGHT OF EQUALITY.
In practice, the imperialism of the great powers, the European
Concert, and the hegemony of the United States disregard the right
of equality. All these political manifestations tend to disregard two
fundamental rights in particular: equality and liberty.
By this policy the great powers have in effect arrogated to them-
selves rights which they refuse to recognize as belonging to other
states, such as colonization in Africa, or they assume a guardianship
over other states, considerably curtailing their sovereignty in both
domestic and foreign affairs. It must, however, be admitted that,
though their immediate object is their individual interest, in many
cases the general interest is also subserved.
This policy of the great powers is not the result of their arbitrary
will, as is generally believed. It is the result either of a development
superior to that of other states, which impels them to expand beyond
their borders, or of the fact that they believe themselves, by virtue of
their superiority, to be called to govern international society and to
play a leading part therein.
Every society must, by its very nature, be directed by some one
who will ensure peace among the members constituting it. In civil
society this is accomplished by the legislative, executive, and judicial
powers of the state.
In international life this is not the case. The states.are in a state
of nature and community; that is to say, they have no organization
similar to that which exists in civil society. For this reason this com-
munity has passed through two distinct periods, which may be charac-
terized as that previous to and that subsequent to the establishment
of international law.
In the first period States did not recognize any rights as belonging
to other states. Their preoccupation was to dominate other states by
force of arms and to defend themselves in the same way.
In the second period, which includes the present time, since civili-
zation has established peaceful relations between states, they recognize
certain rights as belonging to each other, but these rights are frequently
disregarded, especially by the great powers.
In a third period, that of the reconstruction of international law,
the society of nations must be organized in such a way as to insure
respect for the rights of states and supervision of the general interests
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss3/1
THE STATE'S RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION.
of society by all the states,. not, as in the case today, by the great
powers alone.
This does not mean that the normal development of the great
powers must be curbed, as some persons, a little hasty in their wishes,
would like, nor that these states should cease to exert in international
matters the natural influence that prestige exerts in everything. What
we must strive to do is to prevent these powerful states from develop-
ing through material or moral coercion, or oppression of the weak,
without indemnifying them. If the injustice of the strong against the
weak is an evil, the attempt to destroy the influence of the strong is
an injustice on the part of the weak against the strong, which is per-
haps a greater evil than the other.
We cannot, therefore, recognize the absolute equality of states.
subjecting the more powerful to various kinds of restraint. The
equality that must be established, that which is proclaimed and asserted
by the Institute, is legal equality, by virtue of which no state may,
merely because of its superiority, have any claim or pretention to rights
which are not recognized as belonging to weaker states. All states
must be equal before the law.
Mr. Root, while Secretary of State, delivered an address at the
Third Pan-American Conference, in which he described in masterly
style the characteristics that international equality should possess,
particularly the attitude of the great Powers towards the weaker
States. His declaration has been unanimously approved throughout
America and is often quoted and held up as the rule that should be
adopted in our international relations. Given the unanimous approval
of this declaration in America, the authority of its author and his
right at the time, by virtue of his official position, to speak in the
name of the Government of the United States, we may say that Mr.
Root's statement embodied the American conception of legal equality
between States. His words are as follows:
"We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory
except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over our-
selves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest
and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much
respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance
of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression
of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges,
or powers that we do not freely concede to every American Republic.
We wish to increase our prosperity; to expand our trade; to grow
in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit; but our conception of the true
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way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their
ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common
growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together."
In what way, it may be asked, can international life be organized
so as to obtain the result which we have indicated.
We have considered this point elsewhere.' Let us content
ourselves here with pointing out that one of the best organizations
would be a political union among the States of each continent, such as
the Pan-American Union in our hemisphere. Problems relating to
all these matters would there be discussed and solved. It would,
moreover, be easier to establish such an organization than is generally
believed.
III.
AGGRESSIVE RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION.
Besides this aggressive policy of imperialism or hegemony of the
great Powers, there is another kind of political acts, which, though
in the guise of peace, are provocative of strife. These are certain
rights that States pretend to exercise in the name of self-preservation.
All publicists are unanimous in recognizing that States have the right,
indeed the duty, to take such steps as are deemed necessary for self-
preservation and defense. This right gives rise to important ques-
tions, which have been elucidated by publicists, namely: May a State
oppose the increase of military power of another State? If so, what
restricti6ns are placed upon this right? May a State ask another State
for an explanation of an increase in its army or navy, which the first
State may consider excessive? May a State contract alliances to
protect itself against possible attack by other States? May a State
oppose the expansion of another State, even though this manifestation
of progress be of a peaceful nature?
All these and many related questions cannot be satisfactorily
answered from the standpoint of law. In practice these questions are
answered in the affirmative and have thereby become a prolific source
of misunderstanding. The result is a strange phenomenon: the right
of self-preservation, which would seem to be the most innocent, the
most peaceful of rights, may become one of the most aggressive.
That is what has happened in the present war; all the countries of
Europe allege that they are fighting for their existence which is
menaced by their enemies.
These questions cannot be settled satisfactorily in future except
through a sound political organization of international society.
1Le Droit international de -avenir, pp. 72, et seq.
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IV.
RIGHT OF NECESSITY.
Another serious problem resulting from the right of self-preser-
vation concerns the acts which a State may commit in case of extreme
necessity.
Publicists are divided on the question whether in such a case a
State may infringe international law and even violate the territory or
the rights of other States. In practice States have alleged necessity
in a number of famous cases: England when she seized the Danish
fleet in 1807 in order to prevent its falling into the hands of Napoleon;
Canada during the insurrection of 1837-1838 in the case of the Caro-
line; Spain in the case of the Virginius, during the Cuban insurrection
of 1868-1878; Japan when she invaded Korea and Manchuria in 1904
during the Russo-Japanese war. The most serious case is beyond
doubt the invasion of Belgium by Germany at the beginning of the
present war. The statements made on this subject by the Chancellor,
von Bethmann-Hollweg, at the session of the Reichstag on August
4tb, 1914, have become famous: "We are in a position of legitimate
self-defense, and necessity knows no law," and these statements have
since been corroborated by all the German intellectuals, who have
taken the same stand as the Chancellor. The jurist Kohler, professor
in the University of Berlin, has so amplified this thesis as to frighten
and to irritate a great many people, and indeed to call forth vigorous
protests on the part of certain German professors. He declares specifi-
cally that "the relations between States are governed most frequently
by the law of necessity. The State which has to fight for its existence
acts rightly when it infringes the rights of other States, even the rights
of neutrals , for its existence is in jeopardy."
What is to be the fate of this right or alleged right in the future?
The Declaration of the Institute rejects it categorically, and cites in
support of its action divers decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, as may be seen in the official commentary on this
Declaration.
It would seem that in so delicate a matter no absolute rule should
be given, but that certain distinctions must be drawn. In the first
place, legal rules, and indeed the established political order, may be
violated when the general interest of mankind or of an entire continent
really demands it. Though this may seen strange at first sight, it is
not, if we consider that most of the progress in international life has
been effected by violating the rules of the law of nations, since this
law furnishes no adequate method of changing the existing legal order,
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
when it does not meet the requirements of new situations. The inde-
pendence of the New World and the constitution of many European
States could not have been accomplished except by violating the rules
then in force, and what was then a violation has generally been
justified afterwards and sanctioned by public opinion as a principle
of international law.
But we must also lay down the principle that, if the political
or legal order is established by convention and forms a part of what
may be called the public law of a continent, it cannot be altered by
the will of a single State, but that the consent of all is necessary. As
a matter of fact, this principle was laid down in the protocol signed
at the London Conference on January 17, 1871.
So far as concerns treaties of other kinds, which do not form
part of public law, we can follow the rule recognized at the present
day in theory and practice, that a State may refuse to abide by. them
when they would jeopardize its vital interests,--"if the very existence
of the.State should endanger, if the fulfillment of the international
duty would be self-destructive," as was recognized in the award of
the Hague Court of November 11, 1913.2
Finally, if there could be organized on every continent a perma-
nent union of States, the principle could be accepted that a State
alleging the necessity of encroaching upon the rights of another State
could submit its demand to the conference for decision as to the
grounds ;for its encroachment and as to the indemnity it should pay
the State so injured. For greater details on this point, we would
refer to what we have elsewhere said on this subject.3
V.
RIGHT OF INTERVENTION.
The so-called right of intervention, which is derived from the
right of self-preservation and free development, is one of the greatest
restrictions that can be placed on the fundamental rights of States,
particularly on the right of liberty and territorial sovereignty.
At the time of the French Revolution, the principle of non-
intervention was incorporated in the Constitution of 1793,' but
even at that time it was disregarded, and has since been ignored
2 See Revue generale de droit international public, Vol. XX (1913), Doc.,
p. 29; cf. Scott, The Hague Court Report, New York, 1916, p. 317.3 See Le Droit international de l'avenir, pp. 83-85.4
"The French people declares itself the friend and naturally ally of free
peoples; it does not interfere in the governments of other nations; it does not
allow other nations to interfere. in its own." Arts. 118, 119 of Constitution.
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repeatedly. The opposite principle, namely, intervention, prevailed in
Europe during the nineteenth century. In Europe, intervention has
been either individual or collective, and political, religious, financial,
etc., in nature. The peculiarity of intervention is that international
law has no rule governing it. It is left to the practice of the States,
varying according to the period and the country. The Papacy has
condemned as a heresy, the result of modern liberalism, the principle
of non-intervention.
In the United States the principle of intervention was condemned
almost at the very beginning of its independence, and particularly in
the Monroe Doctrine, which, as we have said, has been approved by
all of the States of the continent, and the Latin States have during
the past century reprobated the hegemony of the United States.
Therefore, in our hemisphere, contrary to the practice of Europe.
intervention has never been recognized as a right, although it has
taken place in fact. This idea is brought out strongly in Article -5
of the draft prepared by the Third Committee of the Conference of
American Jurists, charged with the codification of international law:
"A State may interfere in the affairs of another State only in a
friendly and conciliatory way, and its intervention must in no case
take on the appearance of constraint, since the independence and
sovereignty of each of the American nations is a fact and an acquired
inviolable right."
However, there has come into existence a new doctrine, which
the United States itself has accepted and according to which there
may be collective intervention in exceptional cases, to be passed upon
in advance; but up to the present time it has not been considered
advisable to apply it, although there have been serious cases in which
it might have been resorted to.
Besides these characteristic differences between Europe and
America in the matter of intervention, there is a special kind of inter-
vention, on which there is uniformity of opinion on both continents
and for which there are legal rules: intervention for financial reasons
to obtain payment of public debts. A question of this kind arose in
1902 regarding the coercive action by certain European Powers against
Venezuela. The eminent Argentine statesman, Dr. Drago, then his
country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed his famous note to
the Minister of the Argentine Republic to the United States, asking
him to obtain this country's support of the principle that payment of
public debts may not be procured by force. This is called the Drago
Doctrine.
At the Third Pan-American Conference, the States of Latin
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America deemed it advisable not to consider this as a purely American
question, but rather to urge the adoption of a world-wide resolution
at the Second Hague Conference, which took place the same year.
A convention respecting the limitation of the employment of force
for the recovery of contract debts was indeed signed at this Conference,
the first article of which states: "The contracting Powers agree not
to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts
claimed from the Government of one country by the Government of
another country as being due its nationals. This undertaking is, how-
ever, not applicable when the debtor State refuses or neglects to reply
to an offer for arbitration, or, after accepting the offer, prevents any
compromise from being agreed on, or, after the arbitration, fails to
submit to the award."
In short, what this convention established is that compulsory
recovery of public debts is not admissible against a State acting in
good faith, but that it is admissible when the State acts in bad faith.
VI.
THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF INTERVENTION.
If we would now attempt to establish for the future an American
doctrine in the matter of intervention in accord with the political
life of our hemisphere, we would say that non-intervention by a State
in the domestic or foreign affairs of another State should be the rule
and that individual intervention should 'be permitted only in four
cases. (1) When a State by convention or otherwise accepts from
or grants to another State the right to intervene. (2) When the
debtor acts in bad faith, where public debts are involved. In this
case the State that wishes to intervene would do well to make known
its decision in advance to the continental political union, which should
be established. Such a union already exists in America in the Pan-
American Union. (3) When it is a question of guaranteeing the lives
and property of nationals; but in this case intervention must be pre-
ceded by a diplomatic admonition, the peril must be imminent, and
the State where the incident takes places must be either unwilling or
unable to protect its interest. The intervention must be confined to
what is absolutely necessary, and the other States must be informdd,
as in the preceding cases. (4) When it is a question of self-preserva-
tion, but the peril must be direct and immanent, not merely contingent.
This last case is the most difficult to regulate and the most serious,
because it may lead to abuse on the part of powerful States.
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Collective intervention for the sake of humanity or the interests
of the world at large or those of the continent should also be permitted.
Such intervention should be discussed in advance by all the States in
conference, ulho would decide whether the intervention should take
place and in what way.
VII.
PROTECTION OF NATIONALS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
The protection of nationals in foreign countries is a right which
States exercise by virtue of their right of self-preservation and of
sovereignty. It consists of demands made by one State on another
for injury to or molestation of its nationals residing in that State.
This matter of the protection of nationals in foreign countries
is one of the most complex, because, although it is recognized in
principle, it is not properly regarded by international law, which only
lays down the rule that the demand must be made on the authorities
of the country, in which the incriminating acts occur, and that the,-
demands through diplomatic channels may be made only in exceptional
cases. The result of this is that the matter is left to the policy of the
States and consequently varies with their interests.
Perhaps the greatest number of such cases have arisen in the
United States. and therefore this country has the greatest number of
precedents for establishing legal rules on the subject.
This omission in international law has been largely responsible
for the extreme, not to say abusive, lengths to which the States of
Europe have gone in diplomatic claims against the weaker States of
Latin America. They have addressed the States themselves in nearly
all cases, without recognizing the local authorities of the countries
upon which they have made demands.
The States of Latin America have continually called the attention
of the States of Europe to the fact that the local authorities are
competent to act, especially in view of the fact that these Latin-
American countries make no distinction between nationals and aliens
in the matter of acquiring and enjoying civil rights. They maintain
that foreigners who have a claim against a State for damages suffered
in its territory should appeal to the judicial authorities of the said
State, and that the State in which they belong may not protect them
through diplomatic channels except in cases of denial of justice, of
abnormal delay, or of open violations of the principles of international
law. At the Second Pan-American Conference the States of America,
with the exception of the United States, signed a convention, laying
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down the foregoing principles, to which they have constantly appealed
ever since.
The project of the third committee of the conference of American
jurists, of which we have already spoken, contains two articles relat-
ing to this matter of diplomatic claims and the protection of nationals
in foreign countries. Article 1 states: "The citizens of American
States residing in foreign countries are subject to the laws and author-
ities of those countries and enjoy the same civil rights as nationals.
In no case may they claim the privilege of securing additional rights
or of exercising such rights otherwise than as provided for nationals
by the Constitution and the laws." And Article II says: "States
have the right to protect their nationals residing in foreign countries,
when an offense has been committed against their person, or their
property has been injured, if it shall have been proved that they have
been unable to obtain from the local authorities the reparation to which
they are entitled. This protection may not be carried into effect when
the individual for whom the claim is made is, according to the law of
the State against which the claim is made, considered a national
thereof."
VIII.
LIMITATION OF THE- FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF
STATES.
We have seen the privilege which States have assumed by virtue
of their fundamental rights, privileges which, as we have said, are
limitations on the fundamental rights of other States.
Let us now examine the limitations which practice imposes on
these rights in the name of the general interest of the society of
nations, and which relate both to internal and external sovereignty.
In the first place, a State may not, on the ground that it is abso-
lutely independent, isolate itself entirely from the other States or
refuse to enter into relations with them. The great Powers have
compelled certain of the Asiatic States to open their doors to European
commerce, and this action has been approved by the whole civilized
world.
Furthermore, a State may not, on the ground that it is sovereign
in its domestic affairs, refuse to recognize within its territory the
force of foreign laws or the validity of legal acts consummated outside
its territory; in other words, matters of private international law.
Formerly the force of foreign laws and the validity of legal acts
consummated in foreign countries were recognized merely as a matter
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of courtesy, corioas gentium, in the language of the publicists. Today
it is held that it is not simply a question of courtesy, which a State
may or may not extend, but a real obligation which cannot be refused
without violating the law of nations. Private international law would
not thus be based; not upon mere courtesy, but upon a legal obligation.
We must also include among the limitations on the absolute rights
of States, in consideration of the general interest, the duties which
are regarded as moral duties, but which are tending to become legal,
to give each other mutual aid in certain branches of governmental
administration and in humanitarian and sanitary matters. It is by
fulfilling these duties that States have performed worthy acts of
civilization, such as the abolition of slavery, etc. If the idea of moral
duties continues to be accentuated in the relations between States,
the conception of the fundamental rights will take on an entirely
different aspect and give international law a new direction.
Ix.
INTERNATIONAL LAW A PART OF THE NATIONAL LEG-
ISLATION OF EVERY STATE.
A point, which is of the utmost importance for the future of
international law is that of establishing the relation of this law to the
domestic legislation of every State.
The sixth declaration of the Institute lays down the principle
that international law is part of the legislation of every State, thus
putting an end to one of the great divergences between the Anglo-
Saxon and the Latin-American people on this subject. For, while the
former have frankly admitted the said principle, the States belonging
to the latter school have admitted it only in exceptional cases.
International law will in the future be considered throughout
America as genuinely positive law, on the same footing as national
law. It forms part of the national legislation and consequently it
must be applied by the authorities of every country.
But a question arises with regard to this new aspect of inter-
national law. What shall be the attitude of the authorities of a
country when there is a conflict between the national and the inter-
national law?
Many publicists hold that in this case it is the national law which
the local authorities must apply. The Constitution of Venezuela fol-
lows this doctrine, laying down in its 25th article that "the law of
nations forms a part of the national legislation; but its provisions
Washington University Open Scholarship
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may not be invoked when they conflict with the Constitution and the
laws of the Republic."
This solution in absolute terms is inadmissible; it is, on the con-
trary, international law which must prevail over national law, because
it binds the States in their mutual relation. What happens in practice
is that the local authorities apply the national law, but the State to
which they belong is responsible to the country which has suffered
as a result of the application of the national law, and these infractions
of international law, as we have said, are one of the cases warranting
diplomatic demands. In practice, many entanglements have arisen
which have been settled by indemnities.
ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ.
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